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does not weigh the evidence. It will not review the determination that the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. However, in a case where
the Supreme Court has found that there is sufficient evidence of second
degree murder and has remanded the case to the court of appeals to pass
upon the weight of the evidence, the court of appeals has no power to
modify the verdict and make a finding of manslaughter in the first degree.
5
The case must be returned to the common pleas court for a new trial. 7
5s
State v. Sholiton raised the question of the effect of the death of the
defendant pending appeal when counsel for defendant had filed a motion
to abate the criminal prosecution and all proceedings in trial and appellate
courts, and the prosecutor had filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. It was
held that there is no abatement. However, upon motion to dismiss the
appeal, the case becomes moot and is properly dismissed. Upon the dismissal of the appeal, the judgment of the trial court remains in full force
and effect.
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DAMAGES
As is usual, most of the expressions by the courts of Ohio during the
past year on the subject of damages have been confined to bare statements
that the evidence did or did not support the award and that certain evidence was or was not too speculative for the jury to consider. Two cases,
however, are of at least passing interest.
In Maus v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis RR. Co.' a court of appeals
held that it was proper for the trial court to refuse a requested instruction
to the jury that "any amount received by the plaintiff as compensation for
personal injuries is exempt from federal income taxation, and you must take
this fact in consideration in arriving at the amount of your verdict." The
propriety of the jury giving consideration to the non-taxable features of a
verdict is a question which is being raised with considerable frequency in
trial courts over the country. It is, however, a question which has been
passed upon by the courts of last resort in few jurisdictions. The court in
the present case was of the opinion that to give such an instruction to the
jury would "so confuse the ordinary jury with technical tax questions as
to defeat the purpose of a trial."'2 The refusal of the instruction is subject
to question. The necessity of paying federal income taxes is a matter of

"State

v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486, 124 N.E.2d 148 (1955).
' 8 State v. Sholiton, 128 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio App. 1954). The court expressed no
opinion upon the liability of the defendant's estate for the payment of costs in the
criminal proceeding since that issue was not presented by this case.

